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[Sustainabilitank] Jason Linkins - on Huffington Post and AlterNet - writes: “New ...: Likewise, we wish to inform you that the majority of Iraqi representatives strongly reject any military-security, economic, commercial, agricultural, investment or political agreement with the United States that is not linked to clear mechanisms that obligate the occupying American military forces to fully withdraw from Iraq, in accordance with a declared timetable and without leaving behind any military bases, soldiers or hired fighters.
[How We Live Now (And Always Have) in the Future Tense] A Network of Truces: These groups have created a fluid network of fragile truces. They squabble over money, power, ideology and sectarian issues. But they have incentives to keep the peace. Sunni leaders have come to realise that they can't win a civil war against the Shiites. Shiite militia leaders recognise their own prestige and power drops the more they fight.
[International Military Forums] After The 'Surge': During the worst of the civil war in 2006 and 2007, he says, Iraq was paralyzed by fear: "Sunnis feared the future, Shiites feared the past and the Kurds feared both." The hope is that those anxieties are beginning to dissipate.
[iamiraqi Forums : The Iraq Focus] The Iraq Focus : Iraq: Provincial Election 2008: But Talabani and Vice President Adel Abdul-Mahdi, a Shiite, rejected the election plan while Sunni Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi was abroad, deputy parliamentary speaker Khalid al-Attiyah told The Associated Press.
[dairy products] Iraqi presidential council rejects elections law: Kurdish opposition to the equal distribution of provincial council seats among Kurds, Turkomen and Arabs in the oil-rich Kirkuk region ”” outside Kurdish territory but considered by many Kurds to be part of their historical land ”” has been a major factor in stalling the law’s approval.
[Marine Corps Community for USMC Veterans] The Future of Iraq: That is one of the chief reasons for early Shia efforts to seize control of the Ministry of the Interior, which oversees the National Police and the provincial Iraqi Police: Since the Shia believed they were preparing for sectarian civil war, it made sense to develop an independent Shia paramilitary force. But when the chips were down in Basra, it was not the interior ministry or the police that came to Maliki's rescue, but the Iraqi army--in the person of Defense Minister Abdul Qadr, a Sunni, and the Anbar-based Quick Reaction Force, which reinforced the city.
[The Two Malcontents] The Future of Iraq:The decline of violence, the rise of politics: That is one of the chief reasons for early Shia efforts to seize control of the Ministry of the Interior, which oversees the National Police and the provincial Iraqi Police: Since the Shia believed they were preparing for sectarian civil war, it made sense to develop an independent Shia paramilitary force. But when the chips were down in Basra, it was not the interior ministry or the police that came to Maliki’s rescue, but the Iraqi army–in the person of Defense Minister Abdul Qadr, a Sunni, and the Anbar-based Quick Reaction Force, which reinforced the city.
[The Swamp] Pullout debate rages despite calm in Iraq: Of course the members of the "Awakening" don't want the US to go: according to the Jamestown Foundation's Global Terrorism Analysis, "The Awakening forces are autonomous and unaccountable to the Iraqi government. Depending on their rank, members are paid from $300 to $1200 every month by the U.S. military." It's not in their financial interest for us to leave.
[Gmuforobama's Weblog] Obama on the Surge, Pathetic Iraqi politicians, Faith: “And the ongoing question is how can we trigger a serious conversation and a responsible conversation between the Shiite and the Sunni and the Kurds that will reduce the sectarian conflict. That is not happening, and until it does, we are going to continue to see long-term problems, there, and it’s my assessment that until we begin a phased withdrawal from Iraq, we’re not going to get the sort of serious talks within Iraq and in the region, that are required.”
[SWJ Blog] 12 July SWJ News, Op-Ed, and Events Roundup: Two months after fighting in the capital left scores dead, squabbling Lebanese factions on Friday formed a new Cabinet in which the Shiite Muslim militant group Hezbollah and its allies control key ministries and have the power to veto major decisions. The Cabinet will serve only until the middle of next year, when elections may determine whether Hezbollah and its allies, which are supported by Iran and Syria, or the Western-backed coalition led by Saad Hariri takes control of the country in coming years.
[video game job markets] The Future of Iraq (The Weekly Standard): Many Sunni Arab leaders remain angry about Maliki 39 s advisers 39 sectarian tendencies but for the first time in my experience Sunni Arabs are distinguishing between the prime minister and those around him Maliki himself-and even .
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